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Conclusion: Deliberation, Inclusion and Participation
The survey of the political and electoral rights case law of the European Court
of Human Rights reflects a particular approach to the concept of democracy
and the Court’s vision of how to protect it. Central to the Court’s vision is the
ideal of a liberal representative democracy with the emphasis placed on
protecting the key liberal rights of free expression, assembly and association.
Some of the cases lend support for more substantive visions of democracy.
In so far as these seek to restrict the rights of those who would use violence or
undermine the principles of pluralism, tolerance and broad-mindedness that
are the values of European democracy, the Court is right in principle to
accept such restrictions. However, this calls for very careful scrutiny of the
restrictions in question to ensure they do not smuggle in excessively substan-
tive conceptions of the social order. Some of the older free expression cases
involving public morals are troubling in this regard, as is the 2003 Refah
Paritisi case.
The Court recognises the importance of the more explicitly electoral rights
in P1–3, but also indicates caution – usually – when interpreting these rights. It
says regularly that the P1–3 rights are not to be applied in the same way as the
qualified rights in articles 8–11. It also says that more caution is required in
cases concerning the passive right to run for elections as compared to cases on
the active right to vote. And when it comes to questions of electoral design, it
becomes more cautious again. It is rare indeed to find a judgment where the
Court has found a state in breach of the Convention because of the choices it
has made in designing an electoral system.
The support for liberal representative democracy does raise questions about
whether the Court’s approach falls into the trap of replicating democratic
flaws in this model of democracy. Representative democracy might be seen as
a very limited form of democracy in which most persons simply choose every
few years between different groups of leaders. In this sense, most people do not
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experience any real exercise of self-government. Furthermore, this model of
representative democracy may be a form of aggregative democracy or
preference-counting democracy where individuals simply vote their prefer-
ences without having the possibility to deliberate on them and exchange views
and reasons about different courses of action. Liberal representative democ-
racy also risks marginalising different groups in some contexts. Ethnic, linguis-
tic and religious minorities may not be able to influence the political system in
a representative system that after all favours majority rule. In many political
systems women are systematically underrepresented, though some European
states have made significant strides in this area. The focus on elections for the
legislature excludes consideration of other forms of participation and consult-
ation; this is extremely problematic for members of certain groups who can
only participate through participation and consultation, such as children and
adolescents.
And then there is the influence of money. Underrepresented groups in the
political system may include the poor, unemployed and economically disad-
vantaged. Private wealth has the possibility to shape public decision-making
through political donations and advertising as well as social media campaigns
and support for different pressure groups. Structural problems lurk here –
economic inequality always has the potential to skew political debate; persons
struggling to make do will lack resources and time to influence politics; the
need for economic prosperity will usually mean that politicians give particular
heed to the interests of business.
These are classical concerns with representative democracy even at the best
of times. These are not, however, the best of times. In twenty-first-century
Europe, we have political leaders who praise ‘illiberal democracy’, govern-
ments which seek to use referendums to enhance executive power, a British
government willing to suspend parliament for weeks during a major political
debate, and a Russian government seemingly indifferent even to fundamental
principles of international law. The European Union’s responses to the
financial crisis, sovereign debt crisis and migration crisis cast doubt on its
ability to respond in ways that are fair, democratic, even humane. And this is
in a wider economic context where the economic and political success of
democratic Western European states for a few decades in the mid-to-late
twentieth century seem very far away and have been overtaken by decades of
neoliberalism, the financial crisis and austerity.1
1 Berman notes the importance of those decades of prosperity when liberal democratic states
tamed the markets: Sheri Berman, Democracy and Dictatorship in Europe: From the Ancien
Régime to the Present Day (Oxford University Press 2019), 400–403. Similarly, see Roger
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These democratic challenges of the twenty-first century may well reflect the
weaknesses of the type of liberal representative democracy envisioned by the
Convention. The traditional model of liberal representative democracy may
enable some of these problems or even worse may be conducive to them.
There has to be some concern that a human rights regime devised largely in
the 1940s to deal with certain threats of the mid-twentieth century is limited in
how it can respond to twenty-first-century threats. The Convention was drafted
with one eye on the past depredations of totalitarian fascist regimes and
one eye on the emerging communist regimes behind the Iron Curtain. In
numerous ways the threats to human rights, including political rights, in
the twenty-first century are significantly different from those facing the
Convention drafters.
In part this reflects important changes such as the development of supra-
national institutions, the development of globalisation and the increased
realisation that non-state actors are vitally important in relation to the protec-
tion and promotion of human rights. It also reflects important technological
changes such as the rise of the internet and digital media. There is also a
concern articulated by Scheppele, that in some ways twenty-first century
would-be autocrats have become more subtle and legally astute in how they
seize power, or rather how once they win power, they consolidate their
position to make it difficult for electoral and civil society opponents to
succeed.2
Nevertheless, as we know, the Court interprets the Convention in an
evolving manner so as to make it an effective instrument for the protection
of rights. The concern about the subtle erosion of the ability of electoral
opposition and civil society to oppose a government can be addressed if the
Court is willing to consider the wider context in which certain restrictive
measures are adopted. This fits in well with the Court’s own rhetoric and
sometimes its practice. It is a sensitive matter: if the Court says that there are
some practices which would be fine in the Netherlands or the UK but not
Hungary or Poland due to the context, then there are multiple risks. Neverthe-
less, the Court has indicated it will sometimes take this into account, where,
say, a dominant political party adopts measures which disproportionately affect
the opposition (Tănase v Moldova). Similarly, the Court has somewhat excep-
tionally invoked article 18 of the Convention as an independent ground of
Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin, National Populism: The Revolt against Liberal Democracy
(Penguin 2018), chapter 5.
2 Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘Autocratic Legalism’ (2018) 85 University of Chicago Law Review 545.
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criticism where a state has limited rights for purposes not permitted under the
Convention (Navalnyy v Russia).
Such jurisprudential responses would address some of the concerns that
twenty-first-century autocrats are simply more clever than their twentieth-
century predecessors. However, it is also necessary to consider whether the
model of liberal representative democracy offered by the Convention and the
Court can itself be supplemented. The Convention does offer some, albeit
limited, resources to address these concerns about the inadequacy of liberal
representative democracy and to develop practices that are more deliberative,
inclusive and participatory.
A commitment to the importance of democratic deliberation (and to a
degree consultation and participation) is seen in some of the case law. The
general principles of the Convention reflect very well a deliberative demo-
cratic model whereby democratic bodies have the responsibility to legislate for
human rights but have to take the content of these rights seriously. The
doctrine of the margin of appreciation and the possibility in respect of most
rights for there to be proportionate restrictions indicates that the Convention
does not presuppose a natural rights model where the content of rights are
simply pre-given. Rather, domestic authorities, and in particular the demo-
cratically legitimated domestic authorities, have the possibility to shape the
content of rights. At the same time this is not an unlimited discretion but one
constrained by a need to implement the rights taking account the limits of
legitimacy, lawfulness and proportionality. In this sense the discretion of
domestic democratic authorities is limited by the rights that are prescribed
by the international legal order to which the state has signed up. While this
operates at a level of principle, in some instances the Court reviews this closely
in terms of how it plays out institutionally in domestic settings.
So there is some scope in the article 10, article 11 and P1–3 case law to argue
for a more deliberative and participatory model of democracy. Indeed there is
an argument that article 8 may also offer support for this. Article 8’s right to
respect for private and family life has been interpreted to include respect for
health, working relationships and certain environmental concerns. In at least
some of the article 8 case law concerning environmental matters the Court
has looked at the process by which the state has regulated article 8 rights to see
if there has been consultation and thorough examination.3
In several cases the Court has indicated that it will regard state decisions as
more likely to comply with the Convention where there has been democratic
3 Rory O’Connell, ‘Towards a Stronger Conception of Democracy in the Strasbourg
Convention’ (2006) European Human Rights Law Review 281–293.
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domestic consideration of the measure. Sometimes, this has been a modest
requirement of democratic consideration.4 The Court’s respect for domestic
democratic consideration is likely to be most pronounced when the relevant
domestic institutions have carefully considered the human rights issues
through political and expert processes, including careful judicial consider-
ation of the rights involved.5 Where there has been no dedicated consider-
ation of a measure by the domestic institutions, this has counted against the
state. This was the case in the original Hirst judgment as the Court observed
the UK Parliament had simply reinstated traditional restrictions on prisoner
voting.6 A thorough rights-based examination of the issues may mean the
Court approves measures that in other contexts it would find violated the
Convention. The Animal Defenders International judgment shows how
the Court looks more favourably on domestic decisions which have been
the product of sustained democratic debate and forensic analysis that explicitly
considers how to balance the Convention rights.
In requiring states to demonstrate that they have carefully considered the
human rights issues, pursued different consultative processes and assessed
proportionality, the Court would be nudging states to adopt more rational
deliberative processes; in this sense these suggestions are examples of the
procedural turn in the Court’s case law.7 This is desirable in itself, but it is
also a limited approach.8 What happens, after all, if the state goes through
such a process and arrives at the same conclusion? And without addressing
wider issues of participation, inclusion and equality, it is no more than a call
for better evidence-based decision-making.
The prisoner voting saga may offer a test case of how the Court should
approach a claim that the state has engaged in a thorough consideration of a
restriction on a Convention right and concluded that the restriction was
justified. The Court has indicated that a blanket ban on prisoners voting is a
breach of the Convention, but the UK (and apparently the Committee of
4 Hirst v United Kingdom (No. 2) App no 74025/01 (2006) 42 EHRR 41.
5 Not covered in this work, but the efforts of some European states to weaken judicial
independence is also problematic.
6 Sukhovetskyy v Ukraine App no 13716/02 (2007) 44 EHRR 57.
7 Robert Spano, ‘The Future of the European Court of Human Rights—Subsidiarity, Process-
Based Review and the Rule of Law’ (2018) 18 Human Rights Law Review 473; Oddný Mjöll
Arnardóttir ‘Organised Retreat? The Move from “Substantive” to “Procedural” Review in the
ECtHR’s Case Law on the Margin of Appreciation’ (2015) European Society of International
Law (ESIL) 2015 Annual Conference (Oslo); Janneke Gerards and Eva Brems, Procedural
Review in European Fundamental Rights Cases (Cambridge University Press 2017).
8 Peter Cumper and Tom Lewis, ‘Blanket Bans, Subsidiarity, and the Procedural Turn of the
European Court of Human Rights’ (2019) 68 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 611.
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Ministers) believe this requires only tokenistic administrative changes. This
issue will no doubt come back to the Court. Is this a situation like Animal
Defenders International, where the Grand Chamber (narrowly) agreed that
the UK’s careful assessment of free expression in the context of political
advertising justified a finding of non-violation even though there was consider-
able precedent suggesting otherwise? There are, however, differences between
the Hirst situation and the Animal Defenders International situation. In the
Hirst case the Court found that the situation in the UK itself breached the
Convention. This is not just a matter of the UK having to consider what the
Convention principles mean in relation to decisions involving other states.
The Court’s view has been repeated in many cases from the UK, and
reaffirmed by the Grand Chamber in Scoppola. Further, the restriction on
prisoner voting goes to the very substance of the right in a way that the political
advertising restriction did not. The applicant in Animal Defenders Inter-
national had other means to engage in political advocacy through appearing
on broadcasted programmes, advertising in print media, social media and so
forth. Convicted prisoners in the UK system are effectively completely disen-
franchised, leaving aside the possibility of temporary release on licence. A final
distinction is that whereas the restriction in Animal Defenders International
was adopted in order to support political equality, the prisoner disenfranchise-
ment rule cuts against inclusion in the political process. For these reasons, the
domestic consideration of (and support for) the restriction should not lead the
Court to find the situation compatible with the Convention.
This highlights the importance of Anne Phillips’s critique that deliberative
democracy must not just be a plea for better deliberation but must include
considerations of equality and inclusion. The Court has largely worked to
promote more inclusive voting rights across Europe, addressing problems of
exclusion based on race, mental disability and bankruptcy, for instance. The
Court has striven to ensure universal suffrage, even if this phrase was not
included in P1–3’s text. There is more to be done and which can be done
within the confines of the Convention. First, the Court will need to consider
how to uphold its core ruling in the prisoner disenfranchisement cases, else
responses like the UK’s toHirst will largely void that decision of meaning. This
is not just a UK challenge; Russia has also shown itself reluctant to address
prisoner voting rights.
Second, the Court needs to be open to considering argument about
practical inclusion in the electoral process. Most of the voting rights cases to
date have concerned formal exclusions. Yet people can also be excluded
because of any number of indirect means, practices and structures. Persons
with nomadic lifestyles, disabilities (physical and mental) and literacy
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problems must also be offered the opportunity to participate in electoral
politics. So Travellers and Roma may not have settled addresses for electoral
registration purposes; the fact that they have a nomadic lifestyle may even
mean they move from one constituency to another (or perhaps even across
national boundaries). Persons with certain physical disabilities may have
difficulty accessing polling stations or reading ballot papers. The same may
be true also of those with sight impairment or who cannot read. The elderly
and the sick and those in institutions may all in practice have difficulty
exercising their voting rights. In such situations the Court must be willing to
require exemptions to general requirements and to require reasonable adjust-
ments to ensure that people are not excluded in practice from exercising their
democratic rights.
Third, there is one important and common formal exclusion which the
Court has so far not addressed. This relates to the position of non-nationals.
The Court’s unreflective willingness to accept nationality-based restrictions on
voting rights is especially troubling on any democratic model. The Court itself
has canvassed the arguments on residence-based restrictions in a very thor-
ough and convincing manner, but the very arguments which suggest the
legitimacy of residence-based restrictions also point to the illegitimacy of
blanket bans on non-nationals voting. Within the context especially of the
European Union, European states have made important efforts to recognise
voting rights for European Union citizen non-nationals in relation to local
elections and European Parliament elections. However, generally speaking,
this franchise extension does not apply to national political voting processes.
Clearly certain categories of non-nationals are significantly affected by the
decisions of national political institutions. This applies especially to those who
reside for many years in a host state and have made it the centre of their lives.
There are situations where it may be appropriate to continue to exclude non-
nationals or certain categories of non-nationals from voting in national polit-
ical elections, but the acceptance of a blanket ban seems more unjustifiable
than even in the context of prisoners. As debates about immigration policy and
treatment of resident non-nationals are frequently important in national polit-
ics, the exclusion of the persons most directly affected by such policy decisions
is problematic.
These issues about inclusion mainly relate to the active electoral right, the
right to vote. The Court has indicated that it does not apply the same standards
of proportionality in cases involving the right to vote as it applies in relations to
articles 8–11. In cases involving the right to run for election and electoral
process decisions, the Court has been more deferential still. The Court has
developed case law that tackles arbitrariness, problems of clarity and absence
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of fair procedures. However, its record on inclusion in this area is even more
circumspect than in the right to vote cases. The Court’s reluctance to be
drawn into issues of language policy means that there is some scope for states
to adopt policies that disadvantage linguistic minorities. Even here, though,
the Court has indicated there are some limits. The Court has broadly indi-
cated that states are free to adopt measures to promote minority representation
and measures to support consociational arrangements. Specifically, in relation
to consociationalism, the Court has striven to ensure that special measures for
the main groups in society do not have the effect of excluding other minority
groups on racial or ethnic grounds. This is evident in cases like Sejdic and
Finci, albeit that the failure of Bosnia Herzegovina to implement the decision
highlights problems of the efficacy of the Court system.
As regards the threat that economic inequality and private wealth can
deform the public and political spheres and wield undue influence in politics,
the Court has shown some awareness of the issue. The Court has highlighted
that states can claim a legitimate interest in requiring political candidates to
make disclosures about their personal wealth, for instance. In particular, the
Animal Defenders International case demonstrates Grand Chamber awareness
of the importance of ensuring political equality in the public sphere even if
this means regulating free expression, indeed what in many ways is core
political expression.
Nevertheless, the Convention itself is of limited effectiveness in the
economic sphere. This might well be expected in a system designed to
uphold liberal representative democracy. There is little that the Convention
can say about issues of economic equality: it says very little even about social
and economic rights. It protects free expression, free association, electoral
rights, most tellingly perhaps property rights and some social rights like the
right to education, but not – explicitly at least – the right to work, the right to
health, the right to social security and the right to an adequate standard of
living. In the Council of Europe, social and economic rights are more the
preserve of the European Social Charter system, with rather different mech-
anisms of monitoring and enforcement than we are used to in the Conven-
tion system. To the extent that this means the main European human rights
mechanisms do not address social and economic rights (in the main), this
has some risks for democratic practice. Individuals leading insecure lives,
lacking resources or leisure and concerned about threats to their livelihood
and security may not be incentivised to participate in the political system. Or
even more worryingly, they may become disillusioned with the liberal
representative model of democracy on offer if they perceive that it has
failed them.
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There is some possibility for the Convention to offer indirect protection to
social and economic rights. To the extent that the Convention can be
interpreted to offer some protection to these rights, it should be welcome as
moving somewhat towards the goal of a more inclusive and participatory
democratic model. It has to be acknowledged that this is necessarily indirect
and limited and unlikely to address significant questions of economic inequal-
ity that affect political equality. The Court can consider these issues of
economic and political equality in other ways.
As mentioned above, the Court has made it clear that states are permitted to
regulate, even restrict, political rights so as to protect political equality from
the threat of economic inequality. The Court’s positive obligation doctrine
suggests that something more than mere permission is possible. Consider, for
instance, the article 10 case law. Here, the Court has generally underlined the
role of the state as the ultimate guarantor of pluralism in relation to free
expression. This has considerable bite in relation to state broadcasters, where
the state is directly involved as in Manole. Yet there are also potential
implications here for privately owned and run media. Pluralism and access
to diverse viewpoints suggest that private wealth should not be allowed to
monopolise key fora for public communication. A deliberative model of dem-
ocracy would require public decisions to be made based on the exchange of
reasons between free and equal participants, in a context where participants
can consider diverse opinions, sources of evidence and discourses. This
exchange of reasons is endangered if the mass media which helps shape
public discourse is itself controlled by a small minority who benefit either
from their wealth or having privileged access to the political elite (or both).
Such a concentration of control might lead to a narrowing of the range of
opinions, evidence and discourses available to persons deliberating. This
suggests the state may need to ensure a degree of transparency in communi-
cation fora or to adopt rules on ownership. The Court should develop its
positive obligations doctrine to require states to make clear who owns
different media and to ensure there is not too great a concentration of media
resource in a small number of hands. This might require the Court to take a
stance on just what amounts to too great a concentration, but this is a task
that some constitutional courts have been willing to do.
The danger posed by excessive concentration of media in a small number of
wealthy owners is not just a matter of private wealth, though; there may be
unhealthy links between powerful economic and political actors. Populist or
autocratic legalist regimes (and not just them) may seek to limit the scrutiny
they receive by taking advantage of powers in relation to private media. Where
the state plays any role in allocating private media resources, it should be done
on a transparent and impartial basis, with no room for political favouritism.
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Again, in the context of article 10, the Court will also need to consider the
role of digital media. While digital media offer enormous potential to allow
diverse and free expression of opinion, there are multiple challenges. Digital
media can be restricted by the state, manipulated by foreign states or by
persons with resources taking advantage of the inertia of the law in responding
to new technologies. They can also pose a threat to the inclusivity of political
processes, as digital media can be abused to attack women or ethnic minor-
ities. These are issues where the Court will need to consider its traditional
regard for a balanced approach – overregulation may stifle free expression
while underregulation might allow for manipulation of the political process
and harm an inclusive political system.
A deliberative, inclusive and participatory approach to article 10 therefore
must consider the scope to develop positive obligations in relation to the risk of
private wealth dominating means of communication, as well as considering
challenges to deliberation and inclusion in the context of some individuals
having access to positions of media influence thanks to political links, and the
risks posed by digital media. The development of article 8 and article 10 to
include a right to information, in at least some circumstances as defined by
the Court, also highlights another avenue to protect participation.
The article 10 case law emphasises the importance of civil society, journalists,
academic researchers and others with a watchdog role being able to assess state-
held information. However, changes in modern governance suggest that the
next avenue should logically be to extend this line of cases to instances where
the state has subcontracted its responsibilities in some way to private economic
or other actors. The modern state frequently expects private organisations to
discharge functions that either used to be discharged by the state or which are
state functions. This could include the provision of education services, health
services, care homes, even prisons and security. Such organisations are involved
in activities that affect the rights of individuals and broader public interests.
There is the potential for such private organisations to harm individual rights or
the broader public interested, especially if they are organised on a for-profit basis
or perhaps motivated by a confessional ethos. To support a participatory model
of democracy, such organisations must be open to scrutiny. If police forces can
be required to release information in the public interest, then, for instance, so
should privately run but state-funded prisons or schools or hospitals. As the
Convention increasingly puts the states under duties to regulate certain private
enterprises through the Court’s positive obligations doctrine – say, those
involved in environmentally dangerous activities or care provision – then the
watchdog function should mean that there should be access at least to the state-
held information about such private bodies, if not indeed direct access to
information that such private organisations hold.
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The article 8 and article 10 case law highlights the potential for journalists,
non-governmental organisations, academic researchers and others in civil
society to use the Convention to promote more openness and transparency
necessary for a more deliberative and participatory democratic system, even in
relation to private economic actors. The article 11 case law offers some
glimmer of hope that the Court is aware of the need for there to be effective
mechanisms of participation in the civil society and the economic sphere. In
the first part of this century we saw a series of cases from the UK, Turkey and
Russia that developed the Court’s approach to trade union rights and specific-
ally collective bargaining. Trade unions are an important voice in the public
sphere who, through pooling of individual commitment, can agitate on behalf
of individuals and groups that may otherwise have only formal access to
power. The defence of trade union rights was therefore to be welcomed even
if the Court has indicated in RMT that there are limits to how far it will take
this case law. The defence is all the more important given concerns about the
weakening of labour rights and the waning of the welfare state in the last fifty
years. This is a concern not just in states like the UK where trade union rights
have been eroded over several decades but also in some states where autocratic
legalist regimes or others may seek to undermine or co-opt trade unions.
The above suggestions about articles 10, 11 and 8 highlight the limits and
potential of the Convention in promoting democratic practices outside the
official political sphere. However, the scope of the electoral rights remains a
challenge. The language of P1–3 points to the irony that even within the
official political sphere the liberal democratic representative vision of the
Convention is surprisingly limited. The Court has consistently refused to
bring local elections, presidential elections, referendums and other ways of
participating in public life within the purview of P1–3. In this sense the
Convention is a much narrower instrument than, say, the ICCPR with its
article 25. That P1–3 does not refer to broader notions like participation in
public affairs or government of one’s own country leaves out significant ways
of participating in public affairs. The wider notion of participation in public
affairs could include local councils, referendums, presidential elections and
indeed other areas like consultative and deliberative practices (deliberative
polls or citizen juries), appointments to official bodies and other public
appointments. This textual limit means it is difficult to see how deliberation,
participation and inclusion can be promoted more broadly.9 This is not just a
9 See Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford University Press 2000), 149 calling
for more group representation not just in national legislatures but wider official bodies and
non-official bodies wielding significant political or economic power.
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matter of a missed opportunity to support deliberative, participatory and inclu-
sive democracy; these fora outside the limited formal political arena (for the
purposes of the Convention anyway) may be the target of parties with anti-
democratic tendencies to colonise the state.10 Unscrupulous political actors
could use referendums to enhance executive power, manipulate elections for
local councils or presidential elections, appoint cronies to political appoint-
ments and control or avoid consultative and participatory mechanisms. And the
Court’s current interpretation of the Convention would provide little redress.
Whilst the linguistic difference between P1–3 and article 25 ICCPR pro-
vides strong support for the Court’s approach so far, it also comes up against
the principle that the Convention must be given an effective interpretation,
one capable of evolving to address contemporary threats to human rights.
Some judges have given convincing reasons as to why referendums should at
least sometimes be included in the ambit of P1–3. The Court itself has
indicated that there may be the possibility to bring some presidential elections
within the scope of P1–3, though it has not yet found a suitable case to rule this
way. For the protection of an effective political democracy it would seem
important to expand P1–3’s scope. Even before the adoption of the Conven-
tion, the practical relevance of the legislature in domestic politics was often
questionable.11 The period since 1950 has seen the centrality of the legislature
often eclipsed by the role of the executive and the development of links with
networks outside of the formal political system. For the Convention vision of a
political democracy to be meaningful, this trend must either be reversed or the
Convention must adapt. Given the improbability of reinventing a dominant
legislature, adaption seems to be the order of the day. And this is especially
important given the rise of executive governments in some Council of Europe
states that increasingly arrogate powers to the executive, undermine the
mechanisms of political and legal accountability and not infrequently do this
by means of referendums12 or other legal mechanisms.
10 Müller gives the example of populist parties that seek to control the civil service: Jan-Werner
Müller, What Is Populism? (Penguin 2017), 44–45.
11 Chris Thornhill, The Sociology of Law and the Global Transformation of Democracy
(Cambridge University Press 2018), 148.
12 This was the purpose of the (unsuccessful) Italian referendum of December 2016 discussed in
Helen Hardman and Brice Dickson, ‘Conclusions’ in Helen Hardman and Brice Dickson (eds)
Electoral Rights in Europe: Advances and Challenges (Taylor & Francis 2017), 212–215. It was
also the purpose of the successful Turkish referendum of 2017. As this book was being finished,
Russia’s president announced a package of major constitutional change that might go to a
referendum and was widely reported as consolidating his power as he left the office.
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While it may go beyond the wording of P1–3, it would be defying the
purpose of having a guarantee of voting and candidacy rights if these could
be ignored simply by switching power to the executive. And it should not be
lost sight of that referendums are not immune to Convention scrutiny if they
interfere with Convention rights. State action that limits Convention rights
through referendums can be scrutinised, and that scrutiny can, as part of any
proportionality inquiry, consider whether the process of adopting a limit was
lawful, legitimate, necessary – and deliberative, participatory and inclusive.
The other sense in which the Convention is arguably limited as regards the
official political sphere is that its model is one of a national liberal representa-
tive democracy. The Court has concluded that P1–3 applies to elections for
the European Parliament, and this is welcome but it is difficult to see how
the Convention can contribute to enhancing EU democracy until the EU
actually becomes party to the Convention. Should that happen, the model of
deliberative democracy in particular may be one suited to application to the
complex supranational institution that is the EU.
To the objection that these suggestions push the Court in a more activist
direction, there are three comments.
First, the suggestions here are modest and based very much on the approach
already adopted in the Court’s jurisprudence. In most cases they involve
incremental development (extending the developing freedom of information
approach for example), or adapting existing concepts like positive obligations,
indirect discrimination and reasonable adjustment to political concerns.
Second, the Court itself recognises that the interpretation of the Conven-
tion must be an evolving and effective one, taking into account contemporary
threats to human rights. The benefits of liberal representative democracy must
be protected, but we must also acknowledge the limitations of this model of
democracy and the changing contexts of the twenty-first century. The liberal
democratic model has not precluded the rise of illiberal democracy or auto-
cratic legalism; indeed, the limitations of liberal representative democracy
may have facilitated such threats. Enhancing the Convention’s ability to
promote deliberation, inclusion and participation would at least recognise
these limitations. If it is not possible to say they would successfully address
them all, they would at least be striking at some of the key problems.
Third, these proposals are aimed at ensuring that all people are included on
an equal basis in the political process, that they can participate in decisions
affecting them and that they can contribute to public deliberation. All these
seem eminently legitimate, even urgent, tasks for a human rights court.
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